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Baker (2013) showcases the complexity of responses on both sides of the debate concerning 
the ontological status of the first-person perspective. This paper seeks to orientate the 
debate about the first person perspective away from an existence problem and back to 
a justified belief problem. It is argued that the account of our belief in the self, which 
emerges from hume’s descriptive epistemology, opens up the possibility of attributing a 
form of non-evidential justification to belief in selves. 
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in her book naturalism and the first-Person Perspective lynne rudder baker 
(2013) surveys both reductive and non-reductive versions of naturalism 
concluding that none of these versions of naturalism recognises first-person 
properties in their ontological inventory of what exists. Furthermore, she 
argues that the attempts to naturalise these properties through reduction 
or elimination fail. A first-person perspective is a conceptual capacity to 
attribute first-person references to ourselves. For Baker it is this capacity to 
think of ourselves in this first-personal way that distinguishes us persons 
from other beings. Baker argues that this capacity to form complex first-
person thoughts has implications for a naturalistic ontology. For example, 
in reducing cognitive first-person perspective to a complex phenomenal 
first-person perspective naturalist thinkers such as Metzinger (2004) find no 
place for the subjects of experience in their ontology. on this view, the belief 
that a self carries out the act of cognitive self-reference is not epistemically 
justified. Baker’s book showcases the ingenuity and the complexity of 
responses on both sides of the debate concerning the ontological status of 
the first-person perspective. While recognising the value of such debates, 
this paper seeks to advance a different approach to the understanding of the 
human capacity of generating self-concept beliefs. instead of approaching 
the problem through the confines of ontological naturalism, it will be 
argued that naturalism within epistemology provides the resources to 
facilitate the affirmation of belief in the self.
in section one, drawing on elements of hume’s descriptive account of 
belief formation, it will be demonstrated that belief in the self belongs 
to a class of beliefs called ‘natural beliefs’. this class of beliefs contains 
beliefs that are universal and unavoidable features of how we engage in 
the world. descriptive accounts, which explain our capacity to think of 
ourselves in this first-personal way, can provide us with explanation, even 
with instrumental justification, but have widely been thought to fall far 
short of anything resembling epistemic justification1. baker, for example, 
sees no philosophical relevance in appealing to descriptive accounts of 
the mechanisms underlying the first-person perspective. Even if the sub-
personal sciences can provide us with knowledge about the mechanisms 
1   The kind of epistemic justification appropriate within a naturalised epistemological landscape 
is an issue of considerable contention. Given the difficulties in merging the descriptive with the 
prescriptive, many contemporary naturalists are willing to abandon the idea that there are any 
epistemic norms (see Papineau 1993; churchland 1995; Knowles 2003).
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underlying the first-person perspective, Baker strongly rejects the idea 
that knowledge of such mechanisms can supplant or replace knowledge of 
the phenomena that they make possible. section two seeks to show that in 
connecting mechanisms to justification, the descriptive account provided 
in section one opens up new paths to re-evaluate the claim that the belief 
that a self/person carries out the act of cognitive self-reference is not 
epistemically justified. Specifically, it will be argued that the account of 
our belief in the self, which emerges from hume’s descriptive epistemology, 
opens up the possibility of attributing a form of non-evidential justification 
to this belief. this sets aside the ontological question and settles instead for 
a naturalised epistemic justification of our belief in the self.
since for many an ontological worldview lies at the heart of naturalism’s 
philosophical project, it is not surprising that the debate concerning the 
first-person perspective is played out in terms of naturalistic ontology. 
Yet the stated goal of this paper is to orientate the debate about the first-
person perspective and its implications away from the existence problem 
and back to a justified belief problem. Kornblith (1985) emphasises that the 
naturalistic approach to epistemology marks itself out from the traditional 
view by insisting that the question ‘how ought we to arrive at our beliefs?’ 
cannot be answered independently of the question ‘how do we arrive at our 
beliefs?’2. if we place this commitment at the heart of our investigations into 
the first-person perspective we will see that it is possible to open up new 
pathways for justifying our belief in the self. in turning away from ontology 
we can still contribute to discussions about the first-person perspective. The 
prize is no longer the ontological trophy of an affirmative existence claim 
but rather an epistemological award of the status of justified belief.
as we will see, some elements of hume’s descriptive account of belief 
formation provide insights into the nature of belief in the self. in opening 
the floodgates to naturalist readings of Hume, Kemp Smith argued that the 
traditional sceptical interpretation of hume overlooked what was basic 
to hume’s positive philosophical achievement, namely a new doctrine of 
‘natural belief ’. though hume never used the expression ‘natural belief ’, 
there is general agreement that such a class of entities exists for hume, 
and discussion of them has become central to those who consider hume’s 
main concern to be the revealation of non-intellectual resources, located 
within our human nature, which enable us to interpret and respond to our 
experience (garrett 1997; Kemp smith 1983; stroud 1977; strawson 1989). 
2   For example the requirement of total evidence cannot be implemented given our capacities for 
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natural belief in Kemp smiths’ strict sense is a belief which is not supported 
by evidence or philosophical argument, is determined by psychological 
propensities of human nature, and is irresistible. Kemp smith gives the 
following set of natural beliefs: belief in the body, in causal action, in the 
identity or unity of the self and in the external world. these phenomena 
exposed by hume, are not the product of reasoning, they are unavoidable, 
universally held, and necessary as a precondition of action (mccormick 1993, 
p. 106). They cannot be justified rationally but are impossible to give up; no 
amount of reasoning can eliminate them.
It is not simply that they are beliefs which are immediate and unreflective, 
since this would only mark them out from those beliefs that are based 
on reflection. We have many unreflective beliefs that are best classed 
as irrational beliefs. What marks out ‘natural beliefs’ is that they are 
unavoidable and universal. but in what sense are natural beliefs unavoidable 
and universal? gaskin explains what it means for a belief to be unavoidable 
in terms of the belief being “a necessary per-condition of action” (gaskin 
1974, p. 286). emphasising hume’s claim that such beliefs are “inseparable 
from the species”, mccormick (1993) characterised the universality criterion 
in terms of those beliefs “which necessarily arise given the kind of creatures 
we are” (mccormick 1993, p. 107). it is clear that the vast majority of beliefs 
will fail to satisfy these stringent criteria. indeed, most would not satisfy 
one of them, and as a result the set of beliefs which satisfies the criteria 
for being ‘natural’ is extremely small. although this small group of beliefs 
is not the result of a conscious rational assessment of evidence, common 
experience reveals that they cannot be dislodged except in brief moments 
of “philosophical melancholy and delirium” (t 175; t1.4.7.9; sbn 269)3. but 
hume explains that this is not enough to discount them as universal and 
unavoidable. hume’s work famously demonstrated that it is possible to doubt 
the existence of the external world when one is engaged in deep reflection. 
however, hume argues that it is impossible for this doubt to last and that 
this is why no amount of philosophy can entirely eradicate the belief. he 
calls for us to see these phenomena as instinctual features of our being 
which are “inseparable from human nature, and inherent in our frame and 
constitution” (t 371; t 3.3.1.17; sbn 583) and as such they are indispensable 
despite their lack of rational grounds.
hume himself never used the term ‘natural beliefs’ to refer to the small 
3   abbreviations used for works by david hume:
- t  a Treatise of human nature (2011), d. Fate norton, m.J. norton (eds.), oxford university 
Press, oxford.
- ehu  an enquiry concerning human understanding (2006),t.l. beauchamp (ed.), clarendon 
Press, oxford.
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number of unavoidable, indispensable and irresistible mental features 
which he discusses. however, at key points in his texts, when he deals with 
the phenomena which commentators have termed ‘natural beliefs’, hume 
chooses to use the term ‘natural instincts’4.
it seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or 
prepossession, to repose faith in their senses […] (ehu 113; ehu 12.1.7; sbn 
151; my italics). 
there is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm 
and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or 
natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the 
mind. (t 142; t1.4.2.51; sbn 214; my italics).
in regularly referring to ‘natural instincts’, hume continually highlights the 
innate primacy of the phenomena to which he is referring. We are asked to 
let go off the idea that these phenomena are beliefs and accept them in their 
true form as “a species of natural instinct, which no reasoning or process of 
the thought and understanding is able either to produce or prevent” (ehu 
39; ehu 5.1.8; sbn 47).
What hume has revealed are universal, unavoidable instincts in accordance 
with which all experience is processed. that i operate in the world as if i 
am a continuous and distinct person, is not the consequence of any belief 
which I affirm. Rather, it is a result of universal, unavoidable capacities to 
which my humanity binds me. it is a fundamental component of how we 
operate in the world and of how we form beliefs. We have the instinctual 
capacity of forming beliefs about the self, and this capacity is constitutive 
and regulative of the way in which we think about ourselves and about 
the world. Although the findings of Hume’s descriptive account identify 
natural beliefs to be non-rational, to call these beliefs either irrational or 
unreasonable is problematic given that they are indispensable for human 
action.
the descriptive account of mechanism which hume is engaged with would 
today be the remit of the cognitive scientist; indeed Fodor describes hume’s 
Treatise as “the foundational document of cognitive science” (Fodor 2003, 
p. 134). such descriptive accounts are seen as having no bearing on the 
philosophical discussions of the first-person perspective. The reason for 
this is clearly stated by baker (2013) when she characterises the interest 
of the cognitive scientists in the first-person perspective as consisting 
not in eliminating or reducing it but in ascertaining its reliability as a 
4   i have discussed this shift from belief to instinct in relation to causal belief in campbell 2006.
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cognitive faculty. regardless of the outcome of such an assessment these 
investigations cannot show how impersonal science can accommodate it. 
baker has indicated that her concern is upstream from such psychological 
and epistemological matters. but hume’s descriptive account here is not 
concerned with the contents of our inner lives, or with how reliable we 
are in reporting our reasons for thinking as we do. We will see in section 
Two how the descriptive findings impact on the normative options we 
can appeal to. in identifying universal and unavoidable aspects of how we 
engage in the world, hume’s descriptive account of belief formation points 
to psychological and epistemological matters which are central to the 
question of ‘under what condition can we have beliefs about our beliefs at 
all?’. however, hume’s main concern is not what is required for us to have 
self-concept beliefs, but rather, given that we universally and unavoidably 
do have them, what are the implications for epistemic norm building? how 
are we to get from the descriptive findings of an investigation into belief 
generation to normative recommendations? this will be explored in the 
following section.
in order to carry any kind of force, a normative philosophy needs to be 
based on the realities of how human beings do in fact operate in the world. 
that i universally and unavoidably operate in the world as if i was a self has 
implications for the normative status of the belief in the self. there is a real 
sense in which a description of our cognitive abilities is essential to establish 
any genuine epistemic norm. harold i. brown, in his article “Psychology, 
naturalized epistemology and rationality”, characterised the danger of 
discarding such descriptive findings as follows:
if we attempt to proceed a priori we may well end up with norms that 
have no legitimate force for human beings because they make demands 
on us that we cannot possibly fulfill. In other words, we need an account 
of the appropriate epistemic norms for human beings; an account of what is 
normatively rational, requires a prior account of what is rational in the 
descriptive sense – an account of what cognitive abilities human beings 
have available (brown 1996, p. 20).
according to hume, natural beliefs are universal unavoidable features of 
how we operate in the world; as such, any account of appropriate epistemic 
norms must incorporate them. As a specific feature of human beings, these 
natural beliefs determine how we pursue the epistemologist’s tasks. if we 
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and irresistible aspects of how we engage in the world, then the norms we 
establish will have no import for human beings. goldman also makes it 
clear that cognitive science is relevant to certain epistemological questions, 
stating that “to the extent that human epistemic attainments critically 
depend on human cognitive endowments, those endowments are relevant 
to epistemology” (goldman 2002, p. 146). in the introduction to the Treatise 
hume goes further, emphasising the importance of providing a ‘science of 
man’, since there is no question of any importance which “can be decided 
with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science” (t 4; t 
Intro; SBN xvi). We cannot insulate our understanding of the justification of 
our belief in selves from the implications of answers to the question ‘how do 
we arrive at our beliefs?’. the effect of identifying universal and unavoidable 
features of how we engage in the world must ripple out into how we form 
normative theories in this area. as brown states, “epistemic norms that are 
based on a particular account of our cognitive abilities become suspect if 
that account is rejected, and norms that require us to do what is beyond our 
capabilities are surely unacceptable” (brown 1996, p. 31).
The natural beliefs themselves and many of the content specific beliefs they 
give rise to are often cited by hume as having a clear instrumental value. 
For example, he states that if we jettison our customary transition from 
causes to effects, a foundation of all our thoughts and actions, we would 
immediately “perish and go to ruin” (t 148; t 1.4.4.1; sbn 225). in doing so, 
he has provided a clear end for any chain of means-end reasoning seeking 
for instrumental normativity for this natural belief5. indeed, audi (2002) 
suggests that “broadly humean versions of instrumentalism are among the 
most plausible contenders to represent instrumentalism as a contemporary 
naturalistic position in the theory of practical reason” (audi 2002, p. 235). 
contemporary advocates of naturalised epistemology frequently commit 
themselves to instrumental teleological theories of normativity6. but is 
such instrumental reasoning trivial and inadequate as a normative theory? 
there is a difference between forming and retaining beliefs for epistemic 
reasons and forming and retaining beliefs for instrumental or pragmatic 
reasons. even if normativity can be retained by appealing to instrumental 
norms contingent upon our aims, the instrumentalist still requires an 
account of the normative force of those aims. thomas Kelly has argued 
that “one cannot immunize oneself against the possibility of acquiring 
5  instrumental approaches to the problem of induction such as reichenbach’s (1963) bestow our 
faith in induction with a kind of practical rationality.
6   For example the following thinkers all adhere to some variant of the idea that the normativity 
of epistemology is simply the normativity of instrumental reason: Kitcher 1992, Kornblith 1993, 
laudan 1990.
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reasons for belief by not caring about the relevant subject matter” (Kelly 
2003, p. 628). The realms of epistemic and pragmatic justification operate 
in accordance with different requirements. While pragmatic responses 
may establish that our natural beliefs have a kind of practical rationality 
or instrumental justification, it cannot establish grounds in an epistemic 
sense. on the pragmatic side, it is clear that we do form beliefs, but without 
epistemological justification it remains unclear if we should form beliefs 
in this way. if, as hume describes it, we are absolutely and necessarily 
determined to follow our natural beliefs, then there seems to be little 
grounds for the substitution of ‘do form beliefs’ with ‘should form beliefs’. 
Hume’s difficulty is with epistemic justification, not with instrumental 
justification.
given that our descriptive account has revealed that these natural beliefs 
are unavoidable there might be a temptation to appeal to some form of 
‘ought implies can’ justification for such beliefs. While noting the application 
of the principle of ‘ought implies can’ in ethics, Weintraub (2003) questions 
the validity of its use in epistemological assessments, arguing that, when it 
comes to epistemic criticisms, ‘ought implies can’ is not a plausible precept. 
although the language of blame (with terms like responsibility, culpability 
and reproach) is present in many formulations for epistemic justification7, 
Weintraub argues that there is no reason to equate ‘epistemically 
unjustified’ with ‘morally blameworthy’. On this reading, one can be 
epistemically unjustified without being morally blameworthy. As Weintraub 
states 
a person who is psychologically bound to believe is absolved from (moral) 
guilt as is a person who is compelled to perform some action. but if he 
believes ‘compulsively’, and cannot be swayed by reason, he is deemed 
irrational, the more so the stronger the grip of his compulsion  
(Weintraub 2003, p. 371). 
in those cases in which i am compelled to believe without the required 
evidence, i may not be morally blameworthy but i still remain epistemically 
unjustified.
in emphasising our inability to sustain doubt in natural beliefs, hume’s 
account opens up a more promising approach to the justification of natural 
beliefs. according to the descriptive account hume provides, natural beliefs 
are placed beyond doubt. In the case of the capacity to attribute first-person 
references to ourselves this capacity delineates the scope of any engagement 
7   see bonJour (1985, p. 8) and Kornblith (1982, p. 243).
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in the world. this understanding of the belief in the self as universal and 
unavoidable opens up the possibility of assigning to it a form of non-evidential 
justification. In the contemporary epistemological landscape we can find 
advocates of the Wittgensteinian notion of a “hinge proposition” also marking 
out propositions that are neither true nor false but cannot be coherently 
doubted. drawing on a line of thought extracted from Wittgenstein’s On 
certainty (1969, §§ 341-343) hinge epistemology has sought to address sceptical 
challenges to the epistemic credentials of our beliefs of hinge propositions. 
Wittgenstein wrote that:
the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were hinges [die angeln] on 
which those turn (oc 341).
teasing out such fragments has led to many different readings of how we are 
to understand the nature, role and justification of hinge propositions.
one prominent approach accepts that hinge propositions cannot be 
evidentially justified but appeals to non-evidential warrants. In this context 
crispin Wright (2004) has distinguished between ordinary evidential 
justification and non-evidential justification which he calls ‘entitlement’. 
this approach expands the narrow notion of epistemic rationality, which 
confines it only to evidentially warranted propositions. It would require 
another paper to fully trace the various formulations of hinge propositions 
and i do not have the space here to provide a detailed account of this debate. 
the goal of the paper is to demonstrate that if we accept hume’s descriptive 
account of belief in the self as a natural belief then this vein of normative 
argumentation is opened up. We then have the prospect of developing a non-
evidential justification for our belief in the self. While much work remains 
to be done in advancing this line of argument, it nevertheless holds out the 
prospect of not just insulating belief in the self from scepticism but also of 
placing it on a knowledge footing. this can be achieved circumventing the 
issue of ontology.
The empirical findings of Hume’s investigation into our belief-forming 
mechanisms conclude that the belief in the self is a natural belief. 
Regardless of which ontological story we tell about the first-person 
perspective, if human beings universally and unavoidably function as 
persons, as exemplified by their capacity to form individual content 
specific self-concept beliefs, than our epistemology must take this into 
account in assessing the validity of self-concept beliefs. this is a case in 
3.
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which empirical findings about our constitutive psychological mechanisms 
demonstrate how natural beliefs may be warranted even if not supported by 
justificatory arguments. As we have seen, descriptive explorations can open 
up new paths for assessing the normative status of belief in selves. such 
natural beliefs cannot be justified in the sense that they are not supported 
by positive discursive argument. nevertheless, given their status as natural 
beliefs they can appeal to non-propositional justification similar to that of 
Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. this approach opens up the prospect of 
developing warrant for our belief in the self even if we have no ontological 
assurance of the existence of something like ‘the self ’.
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